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Abstract. In this paper we review cosmic ray effects on the performance and reliability of 
microelectronic systems and human health as well as the development of the engineering and 
health science tools used to evaluate and mitigate cosmic ray effects in ground-based, 
atmospheric flight, and space flight environments.   Ground based test methods applied to 
microelectronic components and systems are used in combination with radiation transport and 
reaction codes to predict the performance of microelectronic systems in their operating 
environments.  Similar radiation transport codes are an important tool for evaluating possible 
human health effects of cosmic ray.  Finally, the limitations on human space operations beyond 
low-Earth orbit imposed by long term exposure to galactic cosmic rays are discussed.                 
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INTRODUCTION 
Three twentieth century technological developments: 1) high altitude commercial 
and military aircraft, 2) manned and unmanned spacecraft, and 3) increasingly 
complex and sensitive solid state micro-electronics systems, have driven an ongoing 
evolution of basic cosmic ray science into a set of practical analysis tools needed to 
design, test, and verify the safety and reliability of modern complex technological 
systems and assess possible cosmic ray effects on human health.   The effects of 
primary cosmic ray particles, as well as the secondary particle showers produced by 
cosmic ray driven nuclear reactions in target materials can determine project schedule 
and cost for manned and unmanned spacecraft avionics systems. Similar 
considerations apply to commercial and military aircraft operating at high latitudes 
and high altitudes.  Even ground based computational and controls systems can be 
negatively affected by secondary particle showers at the Earth’s surface, especially if 
the net target area of the sensitive electronic system components is large. 
Accumulation of both primary cosmic ray and secondary particle shower radiation 
dose is an important health and safety consideration for commercial and military air 
crews operating at high altitude/latitude and is also one of the most important factors 
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presently limiting the scope and duration of manned space flight operations beyond 
low-Earth orbit (LEO) (1).  
COSMIC RAY INTERACTIONS WITH MATTER 
The natural space radiation environment consists primarily of energetic charged 
particles, primarily atomic nuclei and electrons that have been accelerated to velocities 
close to the speed of light by natural processes (2).  Energetic charged particles 
interact with matter via three basic processes: 1) Energy loss (dE/dx) by direct 
ionization/excitation of material along the charged particle track, 2) high energy 
inelastic nuclear collisions triggering nuclear reactions and secondary particle showers 
and, 3) collisions with material nuclei that produce displacement damage.   
Direct ionization/excitation effects are often described by linear energy transfer 
(LET) or “slowing down” are the primary cause of single event effects (SEE) and total 
ionizing dose (TID) effects in susceptible electronic devices as well as the primary 
cause of human health effects (3).   
High energy inelastic nuclear collisions between cosmic ray nuclei and nuclei in 
target materials trigger nuclear reactions that initiate secondary particle showers 
(primarily protons, neutrons, and pions) in the target material. Further collisions of 
secondary particles with target nuclei lead to expansion and propagation of the 
secondary particle shower, and causes both further direct ionization of the material and 
more nuclear reactions.  The direct cause of microelectronic and human health effects 
produced by secondary shower particles is primarily ionization and excitation 
produced by secondary particle shower tracks (1, 3).  
Both primary and secondary cosmic ray particles can produce displacement damage 
in the crystal structure of optoelectronic materials by elastic collision processes (3).  
SOLID STATE ELECTRONIC DEVICES:  SINGLE EVENT 
EFFECTS (SEE) AND TOTAL IONIZING DOSE (TID) EFFECTS 
Figure 1 shows a schematic of a transistor SEE upset process caused by: 1) direct 
cosmic  ray ionization (left), and 2) ionization tracks produced by in-device nuclear 
reaction recoil products (right).  Ionization tracks through the depletion region in a 
reverse biased PN junction leads to transient current and voltage in the external circuit 
that can change the state of solid state memory bits (3).   SEE effects are not observed 
in unpowered solid state microelectronic devices.   
Figure 2 shows a schematic of an n-channel field effect transistor illustrating TID 
radiation-induced charging of the insulating gate oxide.  Figure 2 (a) represents the 
pre-irradiation condition and Figure 2 (b) the post-irradiation condition.  The 
electrostatic field produced by trapped charge in SiOx layers changes device 
characteristics.  TID damage accumulates over time even if the device is unpowered 




FIGURE 1.  Primary and secondary cosmic ray ionization tracks through the depletion region (white) 
of the PN junction (P light grey; N dark grey) in a solid state device enables transient conduction that 
can cause a change of state in a solid state memory.   The particle tracks can be caused by primary 
cosmic rays entering form outside or primary/secondary cosmic ray particle nuclear reactions internal to 
the device.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.  TID effects in silicon MOS devices.  Accumulation of trapped charge in gate oxide applies 
an electrostatic field to the gate region changing channel conductance.  
Cosmic Ray Effects on Ground Based and Aircraft Microelectronics  
Cosmic ray SEE effects in ground based and aircraft electronics systems are caused 
principally by cosmic ray secondary particle shower neutrons and protons.  TID 
effects on aircraft and ground based electronics are negligible in the natural Earth 
surface and aircraft operating environments simply because dose rates are typically so 
low (4).  
Memory parity errors observed in the first Cray supercomputer at Los Alamos in 
1976 were later determined to be single event upsets (SEUs) caused by atmospheric 
neutrons (5).  Modeling and prediction of cosmic ray effects on computer memories 
was first reported by 1979 (6).  Work continues in this area leading to a JEDEC 
Standard developed for test and measurement of alpha particle and atmospheric 
cosmic ray shower induced soft errors in semiconductor devices by 2006 (7).   
Understanding and controlling SEE effects in ground based electronics is especially 
important for safety critical, high-production-volume electronic systems, like 
automobiles, military electronics, and medical instrumentation where millions of 
products can be in the field and only one SEE failure is unacceptable.   
SEU effects on aircraft avionics systems present a hazard to military and civil 
aircraft operations, especially in the case of  “fly-by-wire” systems, leading to the 
development of technical standards for management and control of  SEE effects in 
commercial and military aircraft avionics systems (8). 
Energetic Proton or NeutronHigh LET Charged Particle (e.g. GCR)
Cosmic Ray Effects on Spacecraft Microelectronic Systems 
The reliability and safety of spacecraft electronic systems are often determined, in 
practice, by the mission space radiation environment. The SEE rate depends on the 
primary particle flux, the extent of secondary particle production in spacecraft 
shielding mass, and the SEE/TID response characteristics of the target microelectronic 
devices (2, 3). TID effects lead to slow degradation of device performance 
characteristics as dose accumulates during a mission, leading, ultimately, to a wear-out 
like device and ultimately system failure (2, 3). 
Approaches to mitigating SEE/TID effects in spacecraft electronic systems include: 
1) selection of electronic parts resistant to SEE/TID, 2) the design of robust, error 
tolerant, system architectures, and 3) software mitigations such as error detection and 
correction (EDAC) and/or fault detection isolation and recovery (FDIR) software.  
A rigorous component and integrated system test and analysis program is essential 
to demonstrate the reliability of the spacecraft electronic systems before flight. 
Accurate definition of worst-case natural cosmic ray (CR) and trapped radiation flight 
environments is essential as is applicable component and system ground based 
accelerated test methods.  Finally, a detailed understanding of the relationship between 
ground-based test results and expected on-orbit electronic system failure rates is 
essential. 
Ground based test methods include testing of individual microelectronic devices 
heavy ion accelerator facilities (9) at heavy ion accelerator facilities as well as testing 
of integrated avionics system boards and “boxes” at high energy (>200 MeV proton 
accelerators (10).   
 
 
FIGURE 3.  The International Space Station (ISS) in low-Earth orbit (altitude range 350 to 450 km; 
orbital inclination 51.6 degrees). 
 
The International Space Station (ISS) provides an instructive example of an 
integrated system test and analysis program. The in-flight geographic distribution of 
ISS SEUs in a particular ISS memory device, as detected by the device EDAC code, is 
shown in Figure 4 and displays the expected higher density of SEUs at high latitude 
(more galactic CRs) and in the South Atlantic Anomaly (trapped protons).  ISS 
component SEE rates were predicted successfully before flight using microelectronic 
component level accelerator test data combined with both the CREME-96 on-line SEE 
modeling and prediction tool as well as the Petersen Figure of Merit (FOM) method 
(11).  ISS system level failure rates were then calculated using combinatorial analysis 
(12).  More recently, use of the FLUKA Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport 
code (13) has produced even more accurate estimates of ISS SEE rates, with better 
accounting for secondary particle showers in ISS shielding mass as shown in Table 1 
(14).  FLUKA based estimates of SEE rates for 11 different microelectronic devices in 
7 different Earth orbiting and interplanetary spacecraft are compared to in-flight data 
as well as CRÈME-96 and FOM estimates as shown as a regression plot in Figure 6 
and in the least squares predictive method performance metric equations (1), below 
(14).    
 
 
FIGURE 4.  ISS complementary metal oxide (CMOS) dynamic random access memory (DRAM) 
single event upset maps for both internal and external memory locations. 
 
TABLE 1.  Shielding Mass Rate Ratio = (Rate 10 g/cm
2




 Note that only FLUKA 
correctly quantifies the shielding mass (i.e. secondary particle shower) effects for the ISS TI CMOS 
DRAM. 
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TMS 44400 1.2 1.2 3.5 3.7 
SMJ41640 0.9 1.8 3.4 5.3 
 
As shown in equations (1), the FLUKA based rate calculations show the smallest 
least squares error and overall acceptable performance compared to the industry 
standard CREME-96 and the Petersen FOM, providing some validation for the 
FLUKA based methods (14).    
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) sponsors an annual 
symposium focusing on microelectronics SEE/TID effects, the Nuclear and Space 
Radiation Effects Conference or NSREC (15).  Also, the NASA Electronic Parts and 
Packaging Program (16) at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and the Office of 
Safety and Mission Success at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (17) are both 
essential resources for spacecraft microelectronics in general and management of 
SEE/TID effects in particular.  
COSMIC RAY EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTH 
Earth surface ionizing radiation dose environments are dominated by natural 
radioisotope decay and man-made radiation source with Radon gas is the most 
important contributor (18).  Annual radiation doses from natural sources at Earth’s 
 
FIGURE 5.  A simple regression plot comparing in-flight SEE rates with those calculated using 
FLUKA based methods, CREME-96 tools, and the Petersen FOM  
 
   
surface range from less that 0.22 centi-Sieverts (cSv) to nearly 1.0 cSv per year, 
depending on geographic location, with cosmic ray contributions contributing on the 
order of 10% of the natural environment total (18).  The Earth’s atmosphere provides 
about 1000 g/cm
2
 of passive shielding mass at sea level and provides the bulk of the 
GCR and solar particle event (SPE) shielding.  The geomagnetic field contributes to 
cosmic ray shielding at low to mid latitudes but contributes little at high latitude and 
even less near the geomagnetic poles (19).  SPEs can dramatically increase air crew 
dose rates at high latitude (20).  
Increasing altitude and latitude means moving into a less shielded environment so 
that commercial and military air crews can receive between 0.5 and 25 equivalent 
microsieverts per hour depending on altitude, latitude, and the state of the 11 year 
solar cycle which modulates galactic cosmic rays in the inner solar system (24). SPEs 
can increase dose rates to air crews flying high latitude/altitude routes dramatically up 
to values on the order of 30 to 50 micro-Sieverts (μSv) per hour (25).  A typical dose 
rate on ISS is 20 μSv per hour.  The increase in annual dose, above natural 
background,  for air crews flying mid-latitude routes is 0.5 cSv per year and increases 
again to 0.9 cSv per year for air crews flying high latitude routes (23).  
The Federal Aviation Agency Office of Aerospace Medical and Human Factors 
Research, Radiobiology Research Team has developed and validated the CARI-6 
cosmic ray nuclear reaction and transport model to estimate air crew and traveler 
radiation doses (19) and provides an on-line flight radiation dose calculation tool (21).     
As altitude increases to include low-Earth orbit environments and beyond, flight 
crew dose rates continues to increase.  Some examples of space flight mission 
radiation exposures as shown in Table 2.    
 
TABLE 2.  Spaceflight Crew Radiation Dose Examples: as calculated using the HZETRN nuclear 
reaction and transport code combined with in-flight dosimeter data and assuming 20 to 50 g/cm
2
 Al 
shielding and not including secondary particle shower effects internal to the human body which can 
increase effective dose (relative to measured dose) by about 50% 
Mission Dose 
Space Shuttle Mission 41-C (8-days, 460 km, 28.5 degrees) 
Apollo 14 (9-day mission to the Moon)    
Skylab 4(87days,  473 km, 21 degrees)  
    0.56 E cSv  
   1.14  E cSv 
  17.8    E cSv 
Estimated Mars mission (3 years)                                             120.0   E cSv                            
 
NASA space flight crew ionizing radiation exposure limits are derived from a not-
to-exceed limit of 3% radiation-exposure-induced death (REID), from cancer, with a 
95 % confidence level (Code of Federal Regulations), where the cancer fatality can 
occur many years after the space flight exposure.  However, there is considerable 
uncertainty in the dose-REID relationship for space radiation exposures because 
nearly all dose-REID data is based on historical epidemiology and the biophysics of 
space radiation is very different from that of radiation we are typically exposed to on 
Earth (1).  In addition, the dose-REID relationship varies substantially with age and 
gender with older men having the lowest cancer susceptibility and young women the 
highest cancer susceptibility (1).  Finally, in-flight crew ionizing radiation dose isn’t 
measured directly but is, rather, calculated using the HZETRN nuclear reaction and 
transport code (1) with input from calibrated in-flight dosimeters and LET 
spectrometer measurements.  Including the contribution of secondary particle 
occurring inside the human body is an important aspect of calculating flight crew 
accurate dose numbers (1, 22).    
An important consequence of secondary particle showers in the human body is the 
realization that  much early work on the benefits of low atomic number high hydrogen 
content materials for spacecraft shielding against galactic cosmic rays has been 
invalidated (22) as is shown in Figure 6.   
The new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV or Orion) design objective is 15.0 cSv 
per year, down from the historical 50.0 cSv per year as driven by uncertainty in the 
dose-REID relationship in the primary galactic cosmic ray (GCR) dominated space 
radiation environment.  AS shown in Table 2, historical spacecraft designs are unable 
meet a 15.0 E cSv annual limit even in relatively benign low-Earth orbit environments. 
Slow accumulation of whole body dose from GCR presently limits the duration of 
manned space operations outside Earth’s magnetosphere to times on the order of 180 
days, assuming historically typical spacecraft shielding mass of 20 to 30 g/cm
2
.   
Uncertainties in the dose-REID relationship and the required 95 % confidence level 
have driven the baseline spaceflight crew dose limit from 100.0 E cSv to 15.0 E cSv.   
GCRs have higher kinetic energy than solar particle event cosmic rays or trapped 
radiation (1, 22) so that substantially thicker shielding is needed to mitigate space 
crew GCR dose during long duration missions.   As implied by the data shown in 
Figure 6, the overall programmatic cost of the available passive shielding needed to 
extend the 180 day limit to 3 years are very likely prohibitive at this time.   Even a 
small cylindrical pressurized living space for a crew of four (D = 4.5 meters, L = 4.5 
meters) has a surface area of 8.5 x 10
5
 square centimeters, and with a shielding 
thickness on the order of 400 g/cm
2
 to meet the 15 cSv career limit, the resulting 
shielding mass is 340 metric tons (about 10 x the unshielded spacecraft mass) for the 




FIGURE 6.  Passive radiation shielding mass requirements for a 3 year  interplanetary flight (Earth-
Mars-Earth)  implied by 100 E cSv and 15 E cSv career dose limits with and without inclusion of 
secondary particle showers in the human body. The in-body secondary particle shower effects are 
included by placing 8 g/cm
2 
of water between the shield and the dose measurement point in the 
HZETRN calculations.  GCR MAX and GCR MIN refer to the interplanetary GCR environment during 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The effects of energetic cosmic ray charged particles on contemporary electronic 
systems as well as human health and safety depend primarily on the ability of both 
primary CR and secondary shower charged particles to produce tracks of ionization 
and excitation in the target material. 
Cosmic ray secondary particle shower species, especially neutrons and protons, can 
dominate effects on electronic systems and human health in high shielding mass 
environments such as: 1) Earth surface environments, 2) high altitude aircraft 
environments, and 3) heavily shielded manned spacecraft. In massive targets, like the 
human body, where secondary particle showers can contribute on the order of 50% of 
the total body dose expressed in Equivalent or Effective Sieverts (E Sv).   
SEE effects on electronic systems can be managed by: 1) selection of resistant 
parts, 2) EDAC and FDIR functions, and 3) robust/highly redundant system 
architectures.  Shielding mass can mitigate electronic system TID and SEE effects 
from SPE and trapped radiation but is largely ineffective against GCR. 
Slow accumulation of whole body dose (expressed in E Sv) from GCR presently 
limits the duration of manned space operations outside earth’s magnetosphere to times 
on the order of 180 days. The overall programmatic cost of the available passive 
shielding needed to extend that limit may be prohibitive at this time.  
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